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Abstract
Service providers offer access to resources and services in distributed environ-
ments such as Grids and Clouds through formal Service level Agreements (SLA),
and need well-balanced infrastructures so that they can maximise the Quality
of Service (QoS) they offer and minimise the number of SLA violations. We
propose a mathematical model to predict the risk of failure of resources in such
environments using a discrete-time analytical model driven by reliability func-
tions fitted to observed data. The model relies on the resource historical data so
as to predict the risk of failure for a given time interval. The model is evaluated
by comparing the predicted risk of failure with the observed risk of failure, and
is shown to accurately predict the resources risk of failure, allowing a service
provider to selectively choose which SLA request to accept.
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1. Introduction
Advances in Grid/Cloud computing research have in recent years resulted
in considerable commercial interest in utilising infrastructures such distributed
environments provide to support commercial applications and services [1]. How-
ever, significant developments in the areas of risk and dependability are neces-
sary before widespread commercial adoption can become a reality. Specifically,
risk management mechanisms need to be incorporated into Grid/Cloud infras-
tructures, in order to move beyond the best-effort approach to service provision
that current Grid infrastructures follow [2] .
Risk management is a discipline that addresses the possibility that future
events may cause adverse effects and is defined in [3] as the process whereby
organisations methodically address the risks attaching to their activities with the
goal of achieving sustained benefit within each activity and across the portfolio
of all activities.
The importance of risk management in Grid/Cloud computing is a conse-
quence of the need to support various parties involved in making informed deci-
sions regarding contractual agreements. Consider a provider that wishes to offer
use of its resources as a pay-per-use service. Interactions between a provider
and an end-user (a service consumer or a broker acting on their behalf) can then
be governed through a Service Level Agreement (SLA), contractually defining
the resource provider’s obligations, the price the end-user must pay and the
penalty the provider needs to pay in the event that it fails to fulfil its obliga-
tions. The use of SLAs to govern such interactions in Grid computing is gaining
momentum [4, 5, 6]. However, such agreements represent a business risk to the
parties involved. An SLA violation could be caused by various events such as
a node outage or network failure. Consequently a provider may be unwilling to
implement such an approach without effective risk assessment.
This paper focuses on a specific aspect of risk management as applied to
Grid/Cloud computing: techniques that can be used by a resource provider to
assess the risk of failure of resources within its infrastructure. This will enable
a provider to identify infrastructure bottlenecks, evaluate the likelihood of an
SLA violation and, where appropriate, mitigate potential risk, in some cases by
identifying fault-tolerance mechanisms such as job migration to prevent SLA
violations. A resource provider’s reputation is closely related to the reliability
of its product (here risk assessment). The more reliable the provider’s risk
assessment is, the more likely the provider is to have a favourable reputation.
A mathematical model for the prediction of the resources risk of failure is
proposed with the use of a discrete-time analytical model driven by availability
functions fitted to observed historical data.
This research has considered resource failures in Grid computing and the
proposed mathematical model can equally be applied in a cloud environment.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• A detailed analysis of Grid resource failures using failure data collected
from different Grid resources and spanning for three years. The analysis
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focuses on the statistical properties of the failure data, including the root
cause of failures, the mean time between failures, and the mean time to
repair.
• A model to describe the time between failures in Grid resources, as well as
a model for the time to repair a resource. Modelling failures and repairs
are crucial in the design of reliable systems and also when creating realistic
benchmarks and test-beds for reliability testing.
• A model to predict the Grid resources risk of failure, which can also be
used to rank Grid resources.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces
the risk management discipline. Section 3 explains the vision of risk in
Grid computing. Section 4 provides an overview of Grid resources failures
data along with the data-collection process and presents an analysis of
such data. Section 5 presents the proposed model to predict the risk of
failure of a Grid resource using a discrete time analytical approach driven
by reliability functions fitted to observed failures data. Section 6 presents
some related work and section 7 ways to further extend this research. In
conclusion, section 8 provides a summary of the research.
2. Risk Management
Risk management plays an important role in a wide range of fields, in-
cluding statistics, economics, systems analysis, biology and operations re-
search. The most central concepts in risk mamagement are the following:
an asset is something to which a party assigns value and hence for which
the party requires protection. An unwanted incident is an event that
harms or reduces the value of an asset. A threat is a potential cause of an
unwanted incident whereas a vulnerability is a weakness, flaw or deficiency
that opens for, or may be exploited by, a threat to cause harm to or reduce
the value of an asset. Finally, risk is the likelihood of an unwanted inci-
dent and its consequence for a specific asset, and risk level is the level or
value of a risk derived from its likelihood and consequence. For example,
a server is an asset, a threat may be a computer virus, the vulnerability
a virus protection not up to date, which leads to an unwanted incident: a
hacker getting access to this server. The likelihood of the virus creating
a back door to the server may be medium, but the integrity of the server
(consequence in term sof harm) may be high.
As explained earlier, this paper focuses on a specific aspect of risk man-
agement as applied to Grid computing: methods that can be used by a
resource provider to evaluate the risk of failure of Grid resources. In this
context, a Grid resources is an asset, a threat may be a loss of its con-
nectivity, the vulnerability a faulty hardware, which leads to an unwanted
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incident: the failure of the resource. The paper only focuses on the likeli-
hood (probability) of Grid resource failures, and therefore uses the terms
Probability of Failure and Risk of Failure interchangeably.
3. Risk Aware Grid Computing - The Vision
The overall vision is the production of a risk aware decision support sys-
tem allowing individuals to negotiate and consume Grid resources using
Service Level Agreements (SLA). This embraces an extended approach to
the utility computing business model, which fits in an open market busi-
ness model (for example for access to compute power) as used in sectors
such as finance, automotive, and energy. This section presents the main
actors (end-user and resource provider), an example scenario in which they
participate, and the resource provider architectural components for risk
assessment.
3.1. Actors
An end-user is a participant from a broad public approaching the Grid in
order to perform a task comprising of one or more services. The user must
indicate the task and associated requirements formally within an SLA
template. Based on this information, the end-user wishes to negotiate
access with providers offering these services, in order that the task is
completed. The end-user must make informed, risk-aware decisions on
the SLA quotes it receives so that the decision is acceptable and balances
cost, time and risk.
A provider offers access to resources and services through formal SLAs
specifying risk, price and penalty. Providers need well-balanced infrastruc-
tures, so they can maximise the Quality of Service (QoS) and minimise
the number of SLA violations. Such an approach increases the economic
benefit and motivation of end-users to outsource their IT tasks. A prereq-
uisite to this is a provider’s trustworthiness and their ability to successfully
deliver an agreed SLA. The assessment of risk allows the provider to se-
lectively choose which SLA requests to accept.
Note the possible consideration of a broker in such context, which acts
as a matchmaker between end-users and providers, furnishing a risk opti-
mised assignment of SLA requests to SLA quotes [7]. It is responsible for
matching SLA requests to resources and services, which may be operated
by an arbitrary number of providers. The broker’s goal is to drive this
matchmaking process to a conclusion, when the provider makes an SLA
offer.
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Figure 1: Resource Reservation and Risk Assessment - Resource Provider
Components Interaction
3.2. Motivating Scenario
Considering the situation where a provider wishes to offer use of its re-
sources as a pay-per-use service to potential end-users, and where the use
of SLAs govern the interaction between them, a provider may need to
implement an effective risk assessment prior to making an SLA offer. In
this case, the provider computes the risk of failure for each resource and
subsequently allocates the resources to the end-user’s job. If the resulted
allocation fails to satisfy the end-user’s requirements, the resource reserva-
tion is revisited; if it does satisfy the end-user’s requirements, the resource
provider then sends back the SLA offer, updated with cost/penalty fee and
pre-commits the resources. The end-user either commits to the SLA or
rejects it.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the interaction of the provider infras-
tructure components. The user sends an SLA request to the provider
specifying the job requirements (1). The provider’s Resource Manager re-
quests the Reservation and Allocation component to reserve the required
resources (2). The Reservation and Allocation component reserves the
physical resources (3) and passes to the Risk Assessor for each reserved
resource the time and duration of the reservation (4). The Risk Assessor
computes for each resource the risk of failure based on the resource his-
torical information stored in the Historical Database (5). The Monitoring
component is responsible for gathering all necessary runtime information
that is collectable by sensors in the infrastructure. The Risk Assessor re-
turns the risk of failure information to the Resource Manager (6). Finally,
the Resource Manager sends a response back to the user (7), either in the
form of an SLA offer or reject.
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4. Analysis of Failures in Grid Environments
As explained in section 2 the resource provider’s assets are the Grid re-
sources in the context of this paper, the Risk of Failure (ROF) of which
is of great concern. Therefore, the probability of failure of a resource as
well as the impact of the failure need to be identified. In order to compute
such probability, the events that cause a resource to fail first need to be
specified. Grid resources can fail as a result of a failure of one or more
of the resource components, such as CPU or memory; this is known as
hardware failure. Another event which can result in a resource failure is
the failure of the operating system or programs installed on the resource;
this type is known as software failure. The third event is the failure of
communication with the resource; this is referred to as network failure.
Finally, another event is the disturbance to the building hosting the re-
source, such as a power cut or an air conditioning failure; this type is event
is known as environment failure. Sometimes, it is difficult to pinpoint the
exact cause of the failure, i.e. whether it is hardware, software, network,
or environment failure; this is therefore referred to as unknown failure.
A set E = (EH ∪ ES ∪ EN ∪ EE ∪ EU ) denotes a full set of events which
include EH the events causing hardware failures, ES causing software
failures, EN causing network failures, EE causing environment failures,
and EU denoting events which cause unknown failures.
An assumption the paper makes is that the sets EH , ES , EN , EE , and EU
are disjoint (or mutually exclusive), i.e. if a resource fails at a given time
t, then only one event from the sets could have caused this failure 1. Of
course, it is possible that two events or more from different sets might take
place at once, yet the person responsible for the resource maintenance will
only identify a single event (see section 4.1).
4.1. Failures Data Gathering
Monitored data is essential in scheduling, performance analysis, perfor-
mance tuning, performance prediction, optimisation of Grid systems etc.
Therefore, gathering data relating to past and current status of Grid re-
sources is an essential activity. Monitoring resource failures is crucial in
the design of reliable systems, e.g. the knowledge of failure characteristics
can be used in resource management to improve resource availability [8].
Furthermore, calculating the risk of failure of a resource depends on past
failures as well.
1Note that causality is the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event
(the effect), where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first. In risk
management, a threat scenario is a chain of events that is initiated by a threat and that may
lead to an unwanted incident.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of Resource Failures into Root Causes (Site 1)
Failures data was collected from the publicly available Grid Operations
Centre Data Base (GOCDB) [9], the official repository for storing and pre-
senting European Grid Infrastructure (EGI) [10] topology and resources
information, which includes monitored data from the UK National Grid
Service (NGS) [11] and Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) [12].
In GOCDB, a Grid resource provider is represented as a site, e.g. the Eu-
ropean Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) [13]. A Grid resource
is represented as a node, a computer/cluster providing Grid services. A
downtime is a period of time in which a Grid node is declared to be in-
operable. A downtime record contains a unique downtime ID, downtime
classification (scheduled or unscheduled), the severity of the downtime,
the contact person who recorded the downtime, the record date, the start
and end of the downtime period, the description of the downtime, and the
entity affected by the downtime. Scheduled downtimes are planned and
agreed in advance, while unscheduled downtimes are unplanned and are
usually triggered by an unexpected failure. The status of the resource is
either at risk (where the resource is working as normal, but may experi-
ence problems) or outage (where the resource is completely unavailable).
This research has considered downtime data of seven Grid resources from
two different Grid sites: four from Site 1, and three from Site 2, in order to
generalise the findings. Downtime data for all resources span over three
years (2008-2010). Downtime data include scheduled and unscheduled
events, but only unscheduled downtimes in relation to resource failures
are considered. The reason for this is that the use of advance reservation
in Grid systems takes into account scheduled downtimes. Grid schedulers
are expected to have access to information regarding scheduled downtimes
so that a job will not be scheduled on a resource with a planned downtime.
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Figure 3: Breakdown of Resource Downtime into Root Causes (Site 1)
4.2. Failures Data Analysis
Resource failure data is analysed with respect to three important proper-
ties of system failures: root cause breakdown, repair time, and time be-
tween failures. The sequence of failure events are studied using stochastic
process [14] and the distribution of its time between failures is also con-
sidered. Notably, repair times are characterised for each resource using
the mean, median and standard deviation. We also consider the empirical
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of repair time for each resource,
as well as how well it fits the probability distributions commonly used in
reliability theory: Exponential, Weibull, Gamma and Lognormal distribu-
tions. These distributions fit the data well, and so there are no reasons for
using other distributions or more degree of freedom e.g. a phase-type dis-
tribution. Notably, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is used
to parameterise the distributions and thereby evaluate the goodness of
fit by visual inspection, and the negative log-likelihood test. The MLE,
unlike moment estimation, is consistent, unbiased and efficient. The CDF
for the time between failures for each resource is analysed also using MLE
and the negative log-likelihood test [14].
Considering the description of the cause of failures information available in
GOCDB data, the description of the failures was mapped into five differ-
ent categories: Environment, Network, Software, Hardware and Unknown.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of failure for each category in Site 1, soft-
ware and hardware failures being the largest contributors. The actual
percentage for software failures ranges between 28% to 35%, and between
41% and 43% for hardware failures. Figure 3 shows the percentage of
downtime for each category in Site 1. Software and hardware failures also
contribute hugely to the downtime: between 28% and 37% for software
and between 39% and 41% for hardware. Note that the downtime due to
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Table 1: Repair Time (minutes) - Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation - Site
1
Resource A B C D
Mean 1922 1611 1658 1829
Median 945 433 1116 865
Stand.Dev. 2496 2341 2089 2346
environment failures is high, ranging between 14% and 27%. The reason
for this is that the site often had air conditioning failure, which required
a long maintenance work.
The repair time metric is investigated by considering first how the repair
time varies among resources, the statistical proprieties of the repair time
for each resource including their distributions, and finally how the root
cause affects the repair time. Table 1 shows the mean, median and stan-
dard deviation for the repair time in Site 1. The mean repair time of all
resources is high because the repair time depends mainly on the availabil-
ity of the Grid administrator, and this site does not have 24-hour user
support. Thus, any resource failure occurring after normal working hours
is not dealt with before the next working day; this also holds for week-
ends and public holidays. Another reason is that there is no automatic
monitoring in place that will report a resource failure when it occurs. The
standard deviation shows a large spread of the data.
Another observation is that resource repair time is highly variable, which
indicates that the Exponential distribution is not conventional to express
it. With this in mind, it should be noted that an Exponential distribu-
tion with failure rate λ the mean is 1/λ and the median ln(2)/λ, which is
0.6931/λ [15]; thus, the mean and median should not have a huge differ-
ence. To confirm this observation, the empirical Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) for repair time in each resource is fitted with four stan-
dard distributions: Exponential, Weibull, Gamma and Lognormal. The
CDF - referred to as F (x) - describes the probability distribution of a
real-valued random variable X to be less than x:
F (x) = P{X < x}
That is, for a given value x, F (x) is the probability that the observed
value of X will be at most x.
Figure 4 (left) shows the CDF of repair time for Resource A, Site 1. Vi-
sual inspection indicates both Lognormal and Weibull distributions have
a good fit, but Lognormal fit the data slightly better when tested using
the negative log-likelihood. The Exponential distribution is the worst fit,
as expected, and it is not accurate for the purpose of modelling the repair
time of this resource. Similar findings are recorded for resources B and C
with Weibull and Lognormal having the best fit respectively, wheras for
9
Figure 4: (a) Resource A Site 1 - Repair Time; (b) Time between Failures
Table 2: Resource A Site 1 - Repair Time (minutes) according to Failure Cate-
gories
Category Software Hardware Network Environment Unknown
Mean 1900 1887 432 4185 1120
Median 1120 961 120 5444 1120
Stand.Dev. 2136 2710 593 3451 -
resource D Weibull and Lognormal distributions create an equally good
visual fit. In the following, due to space limitations the results will be
shown for resource A in site 1 only.
Table 2 shows the mean, median and standard deviation for resource A
site 1 repair time according to failure categories. The repair time average
is 7 hours for network failures and up to 3 days for environment errors.
Overall, the repair time is highly variable for all resources in site 1. An-
other observation is that software and hardware failure affect individual
machines, whilst a network or an environment failure, e.g. a power cut
may affect a cluster or even the entire Grid site.
The time between (unscheduled) failures is also analysed for each resource.
Figure 4 (right) shows the CDF of the time between failures for Resource
A, Site 1. In this case, the distribution between failures is well modelled
by a Weibull distribution, which creates a good visual fit and the best fit
when tested using the negative log-likelihood. The Gamma distribution is
the second best fit. Similar findings are recorded for resources B and C,
wheras for resource D Weibull and Gamma distributions create an equally
good visual fit. The Weibull distribution is the most popular and widely
used method of analysing and predicting failures and malfunctions of all
types, and offers flexibility in modelling failure rates [16].
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The Weibull distribution is used to mathematically characterize the prob-
ability of system failures as a function of time. How the time since the last
failure influences the expected time until the next failure is captured by
a distribution’s hazard rate function. An increasing hazard rate function
predicts that the probability of failure increases with time. A decreas-
ing hazard rate function predicts the reverse. The maximum likelihood
estimation is used to predict the shape parameter, which is found to be
0.63 for resource A. This shape parameter of less than 1 indicates that the
hazard rate function is decreasing, i.e. not seeing a failure for a long time
decreases the chance of seeing one in the near future.
Random processes [17] are tested as probabilistic models for Grid resource
failures [18]. The results show that random processes are not suitable
for modelling Grid resources failure. The Homogeneous Poisson Process
(HPP) assumes that the time between failures follows the exponential
distribution, yet the time between failures in Grid environments follows
a Weibull distribution. The renewal process assumes that the repair of
failed component return it to as good as new state, yet in Grid environ-
ments repairs do not return the resources to as good as new state. The
modified renewal process assumes that the distribution of the first failure
differs from the distribution of the time of the second, third or subsequent
failures. This assumption is not valid in Grid environments since the dis-
tribution of the time between failures follows the Weibull distribution and
does not change between subsequent failures. The alternating renewal pro-
cess assumes that the distribution of the time between failures is identical
and independent. In Grid environments assuming an identical distribution
is inadequate. Finally the Non-Homogeneous Process (NHPP), which is
widely assumed in modelling computer systems, is not fit for modelling
Grid resources failure. Results in [18] show that it is highly unlikely that
Grid resource failures are modelled by a NHPP following a power or ex-
ponential low.
So far, the behaviour of Grid resources has been described in statistical
terms. Next, a new mathematical model to assess the risk of Grid resource
failures is introduced.
5. Risk of Failure Models
5.1. Availability Model
Recall that a Grid resource ROF at time t is the probability of the resource
not functioning at t. This can be defined as one minus the probability of
the resource functioning at t. By computing the probability of the resource
functioning at t, known as availability A(t), the resource ROF is expressed
as (1−A(t)). The proposed availability model is based on Markov Models
[19] where the concepts of state and state transition are used to model the
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Grid resource states as shown in data collected from GOCDB (see section
4.1): up (state 0), at risk (state 1), and outage (state 2).
The memoryless property or constant failure rate assumption is a crucial
assumption in Markov modelling, which is a popular technique for reliabil-
ity analysis. In other words, for Grid resources the transition probabilities
between states are determined by the present state only, and not by his-
tory. For continuous-time models, the length of time already spent in a
state does not influence either the transition rate of the next state or the
remaining time in the same state before the next transition. This general
assumption implies that the waiting time spent in any state is exponen-
tially distributed in the continuous-time case or geometrically distributed
in the discrete-time models.
Thus, Markov models assume that failure rates are constant, thereby lead-
ing to exponentially distributed inter-arrival time of failures and Poisson
arrival of failures. A useful generalisation of Markov Models is the Time-
Varying Markov Models, which allow state transition probability to change
over time; thus, the failure rate is no longer assumed as constant [19]. With
this relaxed assumption, the Grid resources can be modelled with the use
of the time-varying Markov model. Since Grid resources failures and re-
pairs occur at varying intervals, a continuous time-varying Markov model
is used for Grid resource availability (see Figure 5). The transition matrix
for the continuous time-varying Markov model is:
P (t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ZW (t) ZF (t)
ZR(t) 0 zF (t)
ZG(t) 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
The resource will start in State 0 (UP) and operates until either: (1) the
performance degrades and the resource transits to State 1 (AT RISK);
or (2) the resource stops working and transits to State 2 (DOWN). The
rate of events causing transition from state 0 to 1 is ZW (t) whilst ZR(t) is
the rate of recovery events that result in the resource returning to State
0. Moreover, ZF (t) is the rate of events that leads to resource failure,
whereas ZG(t) is the rate of repair resulting in the resource returning to
State 0.
In order to predict the Grid resource availability, the continuous time-
varying Markov model is developed by applying transition functions ZW (t),
ZR(t), ZF (t), and ZG(t) derived from the distributions fitted to failure
data. Therefore, Section 5.2 deals with establishing distributions for the
transition functions, whilst Section 5.3 presents the analysis of the model.
5.2. Failure Data Fitting Distributions
In order to determine the time-varying functions ZW (t), ZR(t), ZF (t),
and ZG(t) for the continuous time-varying Markov model shown in Figure
12
Figure 5: Continuous Time-Varying Markov Model for Resource Avail-
ability
Figure 6: Time-Varying Functions ZW (t) and ZR(t) (Resource A Site 1)
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Figure 7: Time-Varying Functions ZF (t) and ZG(t) (Resource A Site 1)
5, the sequence of unscheduled events as well as the downtime data are
analysed for each resource. There are two types of events: the first is At
Risk, which represents a transition from State 0 to State 1; the second is
complete failure, which represents the transition from State 0 to State 2.
For each event, the time to repair the resource is recorded and represents
the time to return the resource to State 0 from State 1 or 2.
The CDF of the functions ZW (t), ZR(t), ZF (t), and ZG(t) for each re-
source is fitted with four standard distributions: Exponential, Weibull,
Gamma and Lognormal; this helps to determine the best fit for each func-
tion. The MLE is used to parameterise the distributions, and the goodness
of fit is evaluated using the negative log-likelihood test.
Figures 6 and 7 show that for resource A in site 1 the time between transi-
tions from State 0 to 1, ZW (t), is well modelled by Weibull or Lognormal
distribution, yet the Weibull is a better fit when tested with the use of a
negative log-likelihood. The time between transitions from State 0 to 2,
ZF (t), is well modelled by Weibull or Gamma; both distributions create
an equally good visual fit and the same negative log-likelihood. The repair
time is the time to return the resource to State 0 from State 1 or State
2. Moreover, the time between the transitions from State 1 to State 0,
ZR(t), is well modelled by Weibull or Lognormal distribution, yet the Log-
normal is a better fit when tested with the use of a negative log-likelihood.
Finally, the time between transitions from State 2 to State 0, ZG(t), is
well modelled by Weibull or Lognormal distribution, yet the Weibull is
a better fit when tested using the negative log-likelihood. Table 3 shows
the individual resources along with the best distribution fit for the four
transition functions.
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Table 3: Best Fit Distribution for the Transition Functions (All Resources)
Site Resource ZW (t) ZF (t) ZR(t) ZG(t)
1 A Weibull Weibull Lognormal Weibull
B Weibull Weibull Lognormal Weibull
C Weibull Weibull Weibull Lognormal
D Weibull Gamma Lognormal Weibull
2 A Weibull Weibull Weibull Lognormal
B Weibull Gamma Weibull Lognormal
C Weibull Gamma Weibull Lognormal
5.3. Risk of Failure Model
Following the results in Table 3 we make the assumption that the time-
varying functions ZW (t), ZR(t), ZF (t), and ZG(t) are based on a Weibull
probability density function with unique shape α and scale λ values for
each function:
ZW (t) = αW λW (λW t)αW - 1e
−(λW t)αW
ZR(t) = αR λR(λRt)αR - 1e
−(λRt)αR
ZF (t) = αF λF (λF t)αF - 1e
−(λF t)αF
ZG(t) = αG λG(λGt)αG - 1e
−(λGt)αG
To solve the continuous time-varying Markov model the method that ap-
proximates the continuous-time process with discrete-time equivalent [19]
is used. Figure 8 shows the resulting discrete-time Markov model for time
step δt. Since more than one transition may occur during a time step,
the model must take into account the joint probability of state transition.
As the state transition probabilities for the discrete-time Markov model
change over time, we need to drive an expression for A(t), B(t), C(t), D(t),
and E(t). This is achieved thanks to the models developed by Siewiorek
and Swarz [20].
The probability transition equations are derived, in which qij(s, t) is the
probability that the system is in state j at time t given that it was in state
i at time s (s ≤ t). With this notation, in matrix form the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation [21] is:
Q(s, t) = Q(s, k) Q(k, t) s ≤ k ≤ t
Letting k = t - 1,
Q(s, t) = Q(s, t - 1) Q(t - 1, t)
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Figure 8: Discrete Time Markov Model for Resource Availability
Defining P(t) = Q(t, t + 1),
Q(s, t) = Q(s, t - 1)P(t - 1)
Expanding the equation recursively
Q(s, t) = Q(s, t− 2)P (t− 2)P (t− 1) = Q(s, t− 3)P (t− 3)P (t− 2)P (t− 1)
(1)
Yielding to:
Q(s, t) =
t−1∏
i=s
P (i) (2)
In order to translate the continuous-time probability functions into discrete-
time probability functions, a discrete-time probability distribution is es-
tablished that corresponds to the continuous-time distribution. The cor-
responding parameters can then be calculated for the desired time-step δt.
Furthermore, a discrete-time approximation has to consider the probabil-
ity of two failures during the same interval. Recall that the time-varying
reliability functions ZW (t), ZR(t), ZF (t), and ZG(t) are based on aWeibull
probability density function (pdf).
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pdf = f(t) = αλ(λt)(α−1)e−(λt)
α
The corresponding discrete Weibull function, probability mass function,
is:
pmf = f(k) = qk
α
- q(k+1)
α
Given that f(k) is defined as the probability of an event occurring be-
tween time ∆t and time (k + 1)∆t for some chosen interval size ∆t, the
probability mass function can be expressed as:
f(k) = P[no event by k∆t] - P[no event by (k + 1)∆t]
f(k) = R(k) - R(k+1)
R(k) is the reliability function. By substituting the continuous-time equiv-
alents yields:
f(k) = R(k∆t) - R[(k + 1)∆t]
f(k) = e−(λk∆t)
α
- e−(λ(k+1)∆t)
α
By rearranging terms, we can find that:
q = e−(λ∆t)
α
The probability mass functions ZW (t), ZR(t), ZF (t), and ZG(t) provide
the reliability for a discrete time step n = tn/∆t. The time-varying func-
tions are:
qW = e
−(λW∆t)
αW
ZW (t) = 1 - q
(t+1)αW−tαW
W
qR = e
−(λR∆t)
αR
ZR(t) = 1 - q
(t+1)αR−tαR
R
qF = e
−(λF∆t)
αF
ZF (t) = 1 - q
(t+1)αF−tαF
F
qG = e
−(λG∆t)
αG
ZG(t) = 1 - q
(t+1)αG−tαG
G
The transition probability functions in Figure 8, which represent the prob-
ability of transition from one state to another state, are:
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A(t) = [1 ZF (t)] ZW (t)
B(t) = [1 ZW (t)] ZF (t)
C(t) = [1 ZF (t)] ZR(t)
D(t) = [1 ZR(t)] ZF (t)
E(t) = ZG(t)
The transition probability matrix
P (t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− (A(t) +B(t)) A(t) B(t)
C(t) 1− (C(t) +D(t)) D(t)
E(t) 0 1− E(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
– A(t) is the probability of transiting from Up to At Risk;
– B(t) is the probability of transiting from Up to Down;
– C(t) is the probability of transiting from At Risk to Up;
– D(t) is the probability of transiting from At Risk to Down;
– E(t) is the probability of transiting from Down to Up.
Taking into account that Pi,j is the probability of a transition from state
i to state j, it can then be stated that the probability of transition P0,0 is
the probability of remaining in State 0, which is 1 minus the probability
of leaving State 0, hence 1 - (A(t) + B(t)). The same can then be applied
for the probability of transition P1,1 and P2,2.
P (t) can be used to compute instantaneous risk of failure, which is the
probability that the system will not be operational at any random time
t. Another important aspect is the risk of failure duration, which refers
to the probability that the system will not be operational for a certain
duration (e.g. job execution time). Computing the risk of failure duration
is an iterative process. Accordingly, applying the appropriate values for α
and λ, starting at S = start time, P (t) is computed forward for successive
values of t until the desired finish time T = t ∆T is reached.
5.4. Evaluation
Adopting the technique described in the previous section, the transition
matrix P (t) is computed for each resource using the data from GOCDB
with ∆t = 1 hour. Since Grid jobs usually require long execution times,
∆T should be selected accordingly. However, long ∆T lowers the accuracy
of the model, since a state transition is not promptly recorded. On the
other hand, short ∆T has the overhead of calculating P (t) multiple times,
despite the probability of transition not changing. Therefore, ∆T was
selected to be 1 hour.
The observed risk of failure is calculated considering the data generated
over the last 6 months of 2010. The Weibull shape parameter for resource
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Table 4: The Shape α and Scale λ Parameters for Functions ZW (t), ZR(t),
ZF (t), and ZG(t)
Site Resource ZW (t) ZF (t) ZR(t) ZG(t)
α λ α λ α λ α λ
1 A 0.6741 1124.29 0.6002 1818 0.665 15.784 0.899 40.08
B 0.8616 376.63 0.6409 1385.26 0.7385 10.454 0.5779 47.05
C 0.7154 691.27 0.6384 1113.28 0.8022 17.387 0.8708 32.37
D 0.8326 1138.13 0.6236 974.053 0.7565 12.936 0.8610 37.80
2 A 0.5930 4160.27 0.8959 866.254 0.8715 11.014 0.7814 6.676
B 1.0563 398.589 0.6806 613.096 0.7679 7.8319 0.6767 9.946
C 0.8937 321.602 0.6930 657.811 0.9098 10.984 0.7593 7.392
failures is less than 1, which means that, following a failure, the risk of
another failure occuring soon increases. Therefore, a short time-span does
not reflect the true behaviour of the resource failures.
Table 4 shows, for the resources considered, the values of the Weibull
shape α and scale λ parameters for the functions ZW (t), ZR(t), ZF (t),
and ZG(t). The MLE was used to estimate these parameters. The risk of
failure is calculated as the sum of the probability of transition from Up to
At Risk and the probability of transitioning from Up to Down.
The data from GOCDB is used to validate the predicted risk of failure.
Let TDown denote the time the resource is down, and TUp the time the
resource is up, the observed accumulated risk of failure is defined as:
ROF = TDown
TDown+TUp
Figure 9 shows the predicted one-day duration risk of failure over a number
of days, as well as the observed risk of failure for resource A (site 1). The
resource observed and predicted risks of failure are clearly comparable.
In order to validate the predicted risk of failure, i.e. is a true projection
of the observed risk of failure, the two-sample t test is used to compare
the means of the two groups (observed and predicted risk of failure).
From the above figures and the results of the t test, the conclusion is that
the risk assessment model predicts accurately the resources risk of failure.
Therefore, the Grid resource provider can integrate the risk assessment
model in order to compute the risk of resources failure.
Grid resource failures are unavoidable and, as such, ranking the resources
with respect to their ROF is an important outcome of the risk assessment
process. Figure 10 shows the predicted ROF of resources over time. The
ROF was computed, assuming all resources are available at time t = 0.
It is observed that Site 1 resources ROF is higher than Site 2 resources
ROF.
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Figure 9: Predicted and Observed Risk of Failure (Resource A Site 1)
Figure 10: Risk of Failure over time (All Resources)
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Figure 11: Resource A Site 1 Risk of Failure - with Parameters Variation
(OR: Original Resource, 50DRT: 50% Decrease in Repair Time, 50ITHF:
50% Increase in Time between Hardware Failures, 50ITSF: 50% Increase
between Software Failures)
In addition to ranking resources, the ROF model can be used to mea-
sure the significance of the effect of changes in the Grid environment,
which may include the introduction of new hardware and software, or an
upgrade to the current infrastructure in order to lower resources repair
time. There are various techniques for measuring this significance, the
most commonly used of which is the one-at-a-time method [17]. In this
case, the assumptions and parameters are changed individually so as to
measure the change in output. The one-at-a-time method, along with
the ROF model, are powerful tools for Grid providers to understand the
limitations of current infrastructures and plan future investments. These
tools are explained next.
Assume a Grid resources provider would like to make an investment to
minimise the resources ROF. This investment may be on hardware and
software as they are the largest contributors to failures (See section 4.2
Root Cause Breakdown), or even on experienced system administrators,
expecting a decrease in the resources repair time. Therefore, an experi-
ment is setup in order to investigate the effect of:
1. decreasing the time to repair the resource by 50%;
2. increasing the time between hardware failures by 50%;
3. increasing the time between software failures by 50%.
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Figure 11 shows the original ROF, the ROF if the repair time is decreased
by 50%, the ROF if the time between hardware failures is increased by
50% and the ROF if the time between hardware failures is increased by
50% over a number of days for Site 1, resource A. Day 0 is the time when
the resource became available either after a scheduled maintenance or
unscheduled failure. It can be observed that the investment in lowering
the repair time is the most rewarding; this is because the repair timein the
case of all resourcesis very high, even after 50% decrease. Investment in
hardware or software, at this stage, is not much rewarding as the benefit
on lowering the ROF is limited.
6. Related Work
The approach in this paper focuses on the risk of resource failure in Grids,
which leads to three different fields of research: risk assessment/management,
resource failures in distributed systems, and the use of Markov chains for
problem solving. Some of the related work is reviewed next.
Risk assessment has been addressed by various projects. The objective
of the Consequence project [22] is to provide an information protection
framework and to thereby identify the security risk in sharing data in a
distributed environment. The risk items are used as a checklist of items
to be addressed in the Consequence architecture, without any assessment
of the probability and the negative impact of a risk item.
The SLA@SOI project [23] does not explicitly address risk assessment, al-
though it does propose the utilisation of a prediction service for estimating
the probability of software and network failures, as well as hardware avail-
ability in an attempt to evaluate QoS.
The AssessGrid project [2] proposes a model to estimate the probabil-
ity of SLA failures in Grid environments, and considers the probability
of n resources failing for the scheduled duration of a task as well as the
probability that m reserved resources are available for that duration. The
probability of node failure is calculated by assuming that the node fail-
ures represent a Poisson process , which is non-homogenous in time. The
resource provider risk assessment techniques enable the identification of
infrastructure bottlenecks, evaluate the likelihood of an SLA violation
and, where appropriate, mitigate potential risk, in some cases by identi-
fying fault-tolerance mechanisms such as job migration to prevent SLA
violations [24, 25]. The AssessGrid broker acts as a matchmaker between
end-users and providers, furnishing a risk optimised assignment of SLA
requests to SLA quotes [7] by evaluating the provider reliability with re-
spect to systematic errors. Here, systematic errors refer to provider errors
whereby their risk assessments exhibit a typical trend in the sense that
they tend to overestimate/underestimate the risk of failure.
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The OPTIMIS project aims towards optimized service construction, de-
ployment, and execution for Cloud Infrastructures by offering tools to
efficiently manage the full life cycle of services [26]. The risk factor is
considered during all phases of the service lifecycle for the two stakehold-
ers: Service Providers (SP) during service construction, deployment, and
operation, and Infrastructure Providers (IP) during admission control and
internal operations [27].
A number of studies have looked at resource failures in distributed en-
vironments [28, 8, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. Schroeder and Gibson
[28] analyse failure data collected over 9 years at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), and includes 23,000 failures recorded on more than
20 different systemsmostly large clusters of Symmetric-Multi-Processing
(SMP) and Non-Uniform-Memory-Access (NUMA) nodes. The source of
a failure falls in one of the following: human errors and environments, such
as power outages, hardware failure, software failure, network failure and
unknown failures. They find that the time between failure at individual
nodes as well as at an entire system fit well by a Gamma or Weibull distri-
bution with decreasing hazard rate (Weibull shape parameter of 0.70.8).
The observation that the time between failures is best fitted by a Weibull
distribution with decreasing hazard rate is also evidence in [8, 29, 30]. Io-
sup et al. [35] consider the availability of CPUs in a Grid environment and
analyse availability traces recorded from all the clusters. The finding is
that the best fit distribution is Weibull with a shape parameter large than
1. The reason for that is that many of todays Grids comprise computing
resources grouped in clusters, the owners of which may share them only
for limited periods of time. Often, many of a Grids resources are removed
by their owner from the systemeither individually or as complete clusters
in order to serve other tasks and projects; thus, the unavailability of CPUs
is not owing to a system failure but rather their unavailability by their
owner. Most of the previous studies considered only short-term availabil-
ity data [29]. Other studies used statistical modelling to predict failure at
Grid level not resources level [30]. More importantly, these studies only
consider distribution fitting to failure data.
Nadeem, Prodan Fahringer [30] propose a model to predict the availability
of three different Grid resources: dedicated resources which are always
available to Grid users, temporal resources which are available to Grid
users as long as they are switched on, and on-demand resources which are
only available to Grid users by demand. The models proposed are building
on Bayes Theorem, and predict the availability as a function of day-of-the-
week and hour-of-the-day. This approach has a number of limitations: for
example, it does not differentiate between the unavailability as a result of
node failure and the unavailability as a result of scheduled maintenance or
repair; secondly, the models only consider the hour-of-the-day, and so a 1-
minute unavailability and 1-hour unavailability are treated the same; even
worse if the unavailability falls at the end of an hour and into the beginning
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of the next, and the unavailability subsequently becomes 2 hours.
Another approach to model system availability and reliability in comput-
ing is through the use of Markov models. Hacker, Romero and Carothers
[31] investigated the use of Semi-Markov models to model node reliabil-
ity in relation to large supercomputing systems. Platis et al. [32] adopt
a two-phase cyclic non-homogeneous Markov chain with the objective to
evaluate the performance of a replicated database. Koutras, Platis Grav-
vanis [33] explored the use of homogeneous continuous time Markov chain
with the amount of free memory to model the resource degradation of
a computer system. Furthermore, the use of a cyclic non-homogeneous
continuous time Markov chain in terms of driving an optimal software
rejuvenation model is studied [34]. Dai, Levitin and Wang investigate
maximizing the expected profit in Grid systems by partitioning the service
task into subtasks and by distributing them among the available resources
[36]. A genetic algorithm is presented to solve this type of optimization
problem where the Grid service reliability is a critical component as the
basis of the profit function. An analysis of different types of failures in
Grid system and their influence on its reliability and performance is found
in [37]. Models for star-topology Grid considering data dependence and
tree-structure Grid considering failure correlation are presented. The uni-
versal generating function, graph theory, and the Bayesian approach are
used for the development of evaluation tools and algorithms. In [38] Doguc
and Ramirez-Marquez discuss an automated method for estimating ser-
vice reliability in Grids without relying on any assumptions about the
component and link failures. The proposed method is based on a popular
data mining algorithm, K2, and finds the associations between the Grid
components automatically.
Other work has addressed the closely related issue of failure rates for
resource components [39] such as disk failures [40]. The approach towards
risk assessment is aimed at a granularity level of individual components
as compared to resource level.
7. Extensions
There are many ways to further extend the work presented in this paper.
The risk assessment model presented in this work only considered the re-
sources historical data. An extension to this model is to consider dynamic
data, such as the current resource load or the availability of administrators
to enhance the model, since the mean time to repair a resource is hugely
influenced by the availability of administrators.
A number of studies in section 6 have looked at resource failures in dis-
tributed environments and concluded and there is clear evidence that met-
rics such as the time between failures is best fitted by a Weibull distribu-
tion. There is scope to re-develop the risk of failure model to automatically
24
select the best distribution for the time varying functions, e.g. Gamma,
Lognormal.
Another extension to the risk model is to consider the internal components
of a resource rather than considering a resource as a black-box. This
extension model has different component failures, such as CPU, memory,
hard drive, etc, and drives the resource risk of failure through campaigning
all the component models.
The risk assessment model did not consider the type and intensity of the
workload running on a resource. However, there is evidence of a correlation
between the type and intensity of the workload and the failure rate of the
resource [28]. More importantly, extending the model to cater for this
information will provide a more accurate risk estimation.
The data used to develop the model has been provided by a research
institution. The resources mean time to repair is quite due to 1) the lack
of 24-hour support service, and 2) the absence of an automatic monitoring
service which to report resource failures when they occur. It would be
ideal to use data from commercial Grid providers, if available, to further
validate the risk assessment model.
The risk assessment model was developed and evaluated analytically. There-
fore, it would be beneficial to implement the model on a production Grid
in order to evaluate its overall performance.
This research has considered resource failures in Grid computing and can
equally be applied in cloud computing. The proposed risk assessment
model, its implementation, testing, and evaluation in a cloud environment
are considered in the OPTIMIS project [27, 26].
8. Conclusions
This paper has presented the steps towards the development of a mathe-
matical model to predict Grid resources risk of failure.
The motivation scenario for the Grid resources risk of failure model is
first presented. The events causing resource failures are identified, and
the method for measuring the risk of these events is presented. The need
for historical failure data is showcased, along with the data collection
process.
The mathematical model was developed after a detailed analysis of Grid
resource failures using failure data collected from different Grid resources
and spanning for three years. The analysis focused on the statistical prop-
erties of the failure data, including the root cause of failures, the mean
time between failures, and the mean time to repair. The best model for
the time between failures is the Weibull distribution, with decreasing haz-
ard function rate. Repair times are much better modelled by a lognormal
distribution than an exponential distribution.
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The probability of resource failures plays a central role in the risk assess-
ment process. The reviewed models found in the literature to compute
this probability have clear limitations: the unrealistic assumption that the
resource failures represent a Poisson process, the subjective prior distri-
bution selection in the Bayesian model or ignoring resource unavailability
due to scheduled maintenance. Therefore, this paper has shown that the
resource failures do not represent a Poisson process, fit distributions to
observed resource failures data, and use a Markov model to represent all
the resource states. A continuous time-varying Markov Model described
the Grid resource availability. In order to solve the Markov model, there
is the need to approximate the continuous-time process with discrete-time
equivalents. The resulting discrete time-varying Markov Model is used to
estimate the resources risk of failure.
Such model can be integrated in the resource provider risk assessment
and is a viable contender to enable the provider to identify infrastructure
bottlenecks and mitigate potential risk, in some cases by identifying fault-
tolerance mechanisms to prevent SLA violations.
This research can be extended in many ways: 1) consideration of dynamic
data, such as the current resource load or the availability of administra-
tors to enhance the model; 2) risk assessment at the level of the resource’s
components (CPU, memory, hard drive, network interface card etc); 3)
consideration of the type and intensity of the workload running on a re-
source; 4) consideration of data from commercial Grid/Cloud providers,
and 5) the implementation of the risk model on a production Grid/Cloud
in order to evaluate its performance.
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